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The pursuit of an African Renaissance has become an important aspect of regional
cooperation between South Africa and its neighbours. Transfrontier conservation
areas, or ‘Peace Parks ’ as they are popularly called, have been identified as key
instruments to promote the African Renaissance dream, and are increasingly ad-
vocated and justified on this basis. By fostering joint conservation (and tourism)
development in Southern Africa’s marginalised border regions, Peace Parks are
claimed to further international peace, regional cooperation and poverty reduct-
ion, and thus serve basic ideals of the AfricanRenaissance. This article critically ex-
plores this assumption. Using the joint South African-Mozambican-Zimbabwean
Great Limpopo Park as a case study, it argues that in reality the creation of Peace
Parks hardly stimulates and possibly even undermines the realisation of the African
Renaissance ideals of regional cooperation, emancipation, cultural reaffirmation,
sustainable economic development and democratisation. So far, their achievement
has been severely hindered by domination of national interests, insufficient com-
munity consultation, and sensitive border issues such as the illegal flows of goods
and migrants between South Africa and neighbouring countries. Furthermore,
exacerbation of inter-state differences induced by power imbalances in the region,
andharmonisation of land use and legal systems across boundaries, are increasingly
becoming sources of conflict and controversy. Someof these problems are so severe,
we conclude, that they might eventually even undermine support for African Re-
naissance as a whole. Utmost care is thus required to optimally use the chances that
Peace Parks do offer in furthering an African Renaissance.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Africa in the 1990s has seen the initiation of a wide range of ideology-
laden concepts that seek to both capture and stimulate the continent’s
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development. This article deals with the linkages between two such con-
cepts : ‘Peace Parks ’ and ‘African Renaissance’.
Peace Parks are biodiversity and wildlife conservation areas that strad-
dle the boundaries of, and are managed in common by, two or more
countries. Although the notion of transboundary conservation emerged in
the early 1930s, it really started taking off on a global scale – using the term
Peace Parks – from the mid 1990s onwards. The African continent, no-
tably Southern Africa, shares enthusiastically in designating and develop-
ing nature areas across international borders, in order to create
environmental economies of scale.1 However, not all Transboundary
Protected Areas (TBPAs) are Peace Parks. In addition to environmental
goals, the ‘establishment, creation or strengthening of international
friendship’ (Shine 1997) is an explicit aim of Peace Parks, as is the sus-
tainable economic development of the communities living in or around
the area. Because of their ability to unite these widely diverging goals into
one concept, Peace Parks have attracted considerable foreign donor and
media attention, leading to significant financial support for their devel-
opment.2
Another ideology-laden concept, much broader in scope, is ‘African
Renaissance’, championed foremost by the South African President
Thabo Mbeki. Generally understood as a ‘re-birth ’ or ‘resurrection’ of
the African continent, the African Renaissance concept is promoted as an
ideological umbrella, an overarching response to the wide array of pro-
blems plaguing the continent that stimulates Africans to come up with
‘African solutions for African problems’. Although there is much debate
as to what this entails, the main focus is on issues like regional cooperation,
the emancipation of disadvantaged groups, sustainable economic devel-
opment, and the deepening and sustenance of democracy. While the in-
itial hype around the concept has died down, the African Renaissance is
still promoted with vigour and acts, no matter how elusive it might be, as a
philosophical or ideological basis for the development policies of many
influential African actors. Although both ‘African Renaissance’ and
‘Peace Parks ’ are ‘buzzwords ’, each uniting many goals in one concept, it
is clear that African Renaissance entails a more abstract idea than Peace
Parks. Hence, it is argued that Peace Parks can act as concrete tools for
realising the dream of the African Renaissance. Indeed, advocates of
Peace Parks are increasingly promoting and justifying the concept on this
basis.
In this article, we critically examine this assumption, and investigate
whether Peace Parks can contribute significantly to anAfricanRenaissance.
Drawing on closer inspection of the two concepts, and using the joint
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South African-Mozambican-Zimbabwean Great Limpopo Peace Park as
a case study, we argue that the creation of Peace Parks hardly stimulates or
may actually undermine the realisation of the African Renaissance ideals
of regional cooperation, cultural reaffirmation, emancipation, sustainable
development and democracy. Although plans for Peace Parks can be
found throughout Africa, the focus of this article is on Southern African
Peace Parks. Following South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994,
most of the region has been relatively stable and generally has a higher
level of affluence than the rest of the continent.3 Together with the per-
sonal commitment of many highly influential actors, these constitute im-
portant underlying reasons why the southern part of the continent
especially has engaged in promoting and developing Peace Parks.
A F R I C A N R E N A I S S A N C E
The African Renaissance (AR) concept has been debated intensely for
some years, and there seem to be no signs of fatigue yet. Much has been
said about the concept, and we do not aim to give an in-depth analysis of
the debate here. Rather, we aim to provide a brief overview that will help
us understand the roots of the concept, its dominant themes, and how the
African Renaissance has been operationalised.
The African Renaissance concept has firm roots in the history of the
African continent. Mzamane (2001) even traces its spirit back to the first
rebellion of African slaves in the ‘new world’ in the late eighteenth cen-
tury. This and similar events, according to him, were the first breeding
grounds for pan-Africanism, the term that is generally regarded as an
important predecessor of, and source of inspiration for, African
Renaissance (Landsberg & Kornegay 1998; Hottinger 1999; Landsberg &
Hlophe 1999). The vision of pan-Africanism, most eloquently articulated
during the wave of political independence in the 1960s by the likes of
Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, imagined a ‘United States of
Africa’, undivided by arbitrarily drawn borders imposed by outsiders.
Only through such a union could Africa ‘become one of the greatest forces
for good in the world’. Otherwise, Africa would stay ‘weak’ and ‘divided’
(Nkrumah 1961). Even though the realisation of the idea of pan-Africanism
waned quickly after it was first introduced, the dream of a united Africa
has always inspired and been kept alive by many proponents of Africa’s
development.
The roots of AR can be traced to African uprisings or struggles against
‘ traumatic epochs ’ ; from the system of slavery in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries and the European colonisers in the nineteenth and
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twentieth centuries, to the structural neo-colonialist imbalances in the
world economic and political system that started in the 1960s and last until
today.4 This is reflected in the present-day struggle of the African conti-
nent to overcome hardships such as ‘unstable political systems’, ‘preda-
tory elites ’, a high ‘ international debt burden’, and unfavourable
international trade regimes. Together these and other constraining factors
have resulted in further ‘declines in the standard of living and the quality
of life for hundreds of millions of Africans ’ (Mbeki 1999). Dating from the
1990s, this modern use of the African Renaissance concept is often said to
have been initiated by South African President Thabo Mbeki in his ad-
dress to a summit in Virginia, USA in 1997 on ‘attracting capital to Africa’
(Mabogo 2002; Vale & Maseko 1998).5 Since then, it has become a
popular buzzword, used opportunistically by many different actors in both
public and private realms, especially in South Africa (Maloka 2000).
What then does the African Renaissance concept in its present form
entail? By all accounts this is not clear, as the term lacks a clear definition
or description. Vale and Maseko (1998) suggest that the features of the
African Renaissance are kept deliberately vague to create space for mo-
bilising people for a wide variety of issues important to the elites cham-
pioning the AR concept. Because a wide range of actors, from politicians
and policymakers to businessmen and scholars, are using the concept, the
fear of AR becoming a container-concept, in which everything fits, effec-
tively losing all meaning, is not unreal.6 Nevertheless, several dominant
themes recur in the African Renaissance vocabulary. Four are usually
distinguished: (1) emancipation of suppressed or disadvantaged groups in
society (e.g. women, minorities and youth) ; (2) a reaffirmation and in-
creased inter-exchange of African cultures ; (3) sustainable economic de-
velopment ; and (4) broadening, deepening and sustenance of democracy
(Mavimbela 1998; Vale & Maseko 1998). From the perspective of AR as a
successor to the pan-Africanist idea, we argue that a fifth theme should be
added: regional cooperation and a desire for a pre-colonial concept of
borders (see also Griggs 1997). According to its proponents, if the African
Renaissance is to succeed and the twenty-first century is to become ‘an
African century’ (Mbeki 1997), it has to take into account and simul-
taneously address these five issues.
Besides defining dominant themes in the African Renaissance jargon,
we need to explore the conceptual dimensions of AR in order to arrive at a
deeper understanding as to whether the Peace Parks concept could function
as a tool to stimulate an African Renaissance. Vale and Maseko (1998)
distinguish between two distinct interpretations of the future within the
African Renaissance language. The first one is what they call a globalist
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interpretation. AR in this strand links Africa’s future to dominant Western
narratives such as liberalisation, privatisation and stabilisation, thus em-
bracing a modernist concept of globalisation. The emphasis here is on
‘economistic ’ market logic and liberal individualism, which should lead
to sustained economic growth and wealth accumulation. The second AR
interpretation of the future is what Vale and Maseko term Africanist. This
strand calls for a more post-structural interpretation of AR, emphasising
African identity and culture. Africanists want Africa to take its future
truly into its own hands by making use of the wealth of knowledge that
Africans possess instead of being directed by Western notions of progress
or ‘civilisation’.
Despite attempts to direct the African Renaissance dream into a third
way, between the globalist and Africanist interpretations (Cheru 2002), the
dominant reading of AfricanRenaissance, we agree with Vale andMaseko,
is the globalist one. All the major proponents of AR phrase the concept in
such a way that, although it sounds reactionary, it does not contrast with
foreign donor ‘guidelines ’ and hinges closely on the neo-liberal globali-
sation lexicon of the developed Western world. An explanation for this can
be found by taking a closer look at who themajor proponents of the African
Renaissance are. Disproportionately, they are leading politicians, mem-
bers of the business community and influential individuals from Africa’s
most powerful country, namely South Africa, with President ThaboMbeki
as its absolute champion.7 Hence, it is critical to note that besides being
a South African invented and driven philosophical concept for the whole
of Africa, African Renaissance is at the same time also a South African
‘emerging foreign policy doctrine’ consisting of ‘a set of foreign policy
goals and domestic styles and politics entrenched in a set of political, social
and economic relations ’ (Landsberg & Hlophe 1999: 1). This dominance
in the ‘ownership’ of the AR concept gave South Africa a great edge in
determining its operationalisation.
South Africa’s upper hand in operationalising the African Renaissance
has forced the country to try to balance pressures from domestic con-
stituencies with interests from other parts of Africa. That the domestic
constituencies, especially the business community that works according to
the interests of transnational capital, seem to have gained a dominant
leverage is not at all surprising (Taylor & Williams 2001). South Africa in
the globalist reading could ‘come to anchor a chain of economies which,
with time, might become the African equivalent of the Asian Tigers ’,
whereby South Africa acts as ‘ the agent of globalisation’ and ‘the conti-
nent will offer South Africa a preferential option on its traditionally pro-
mised largesse of oil, minerals and mining’ (Vale & Maseko 1998: 277).
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Without wanting to disregard genuine Africanist AR desires, this is attract-
ive for South African political leadership, and thus the globalist African
Renaissance outlook of Mbeki and others does not seem illogical.
Departing from this stance, South Africa constantly tries to engage its
African partners to embrace the African Renaissance concept, and help de-
sign or designate vehicles to aid implementation. Pivotal in this are actors
such as Nigeria (Darah 2000), and prominent statesmen such as Presidents
Museveni of Uganda, Kagame of Rwanda and Aboulaye Wade of Sene-
gal, representing the ‘new generation of African leaders ’ (Ottaway 1998).
Important vehicles that have been designed or designated to carry out the
African Renaissance vision are the African Union (AU), the New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA). Although of a different stature, transboundary Peace
Parks have also been designated as an important vehicle to stimulate an
African Renaissance. The next step is to delve deeper into what they entail.
P E A C E P A R K S I N S O U T H E R N A F R I C A
The Peace Parks concept is part of a distinctive group of phenomena
interlinking biodiversity conservation and borders. Other similar concepts
are Transfrontier ConservationAreas (TFCAs), Transfrontier Parks (TFPs)
and Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs). The difference between
‘park’ and ‘area ’ is that a ‘park’ adheres to one land-use option (usually
strict conservation), while an ‘area’ combines multiple land-use options in
one locale (for instance, conservation areas, hunting concession grounds,
and community-based natural resource management areas). While these
various terms are often used interchangeably, it is important to note that
there are subtle differences between them (Wolmer 2003).
The term ‘TFCAs’ has been in existence the longest and is widely used
internationally. ‘TBPAs’ emanated from ‘TFCAs’ and is typical Southern
African jargon aimed at claiming more ownership over the transboundary
conservation movement (Wolmer 2003). While both these terms still fairly
neutrally describe the object in question, the ‘Peace Parks ’ concept brings
the terminology to a new and politically motivated epistemological level.
By adopting the term Peace Parks, transboundary conservation has joined
the arena of other elusive development concepts such as ‘ sustainable de-
velopment ’, ‘community ownership’ and ‘good governance’, which share
a similar all-embracing motivational purpose. While these concepts
seemingly offer intellectual space for a wide variety of different interests,
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actors and outcomes, they are often operationalised on the basis of one
specific ideology (neo-liberalism), leading to very specific (neo-liberal) out-
comes (Wolmer 2003; Bu¨scher & Mutimukuru 2004). In this article, we
refer predominantly to Peace Parks and TBPAs, but always with reference
to the above remarks.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to give a historical over-
view of the interface between environment and development in Africa,
we have to note that Peace Parks do not occur in a historical vacuum.8
Rather, they are arguably the latest phase in a long and often unfortunate
history of environment and development in Africa, in which the interests
of the native African inhabitants have regularly been suppressed by col-
onial or neo-colonial interests in the protection of Africa’s wildlife and the
economic exploitation of Africa’s natural resources (Gibson 1999; Adams
& Hulme 2001). Moreover, although community-based participatory ap-
proaches constitute the current conservation paradigm, conservation prac-
tice continues to be entrenched in old colonialist protectionist approaches
that propagate the separation of local people from the nature and wildlife
they depend on for their livelihoods (Adams & Hulme 2001).9 Hence,
nature conservation in Africa is a very sensitive issue, and Peace Parks
must be understood within this historical framework.
Since the mid-nineties, the concept of Peace Parks has been so dom-
inantly voiced from Southern Africa that many believe it to originate from
that region (Michler 2003). Nonetheless, Peace Parks are far from unique
to Southern Africa. Their origins can be traced back to the establishment
of the US–Canadian Waterston/Glacier Park in 1932.10 This was the first
genuine Peace Park: a transboundary protected area created with the ex-
plicit aim of promoting peace between countries. The term ‘Peace Parks ’
can be traced to the 1980s, when the World Conservation Union (IUCN)
actively started promoting ‘parks for peace’ on international boundaries
(Sandwith int. 2002), or ‘Peace Parks ’. From there, the concept quickly
gained in importance. In 1988 there were 59 established and potential
border parks, and the number had grown by 1997 to 136 actual and po-
tential TBPAs, straddling 112 international borders in 98 countries (Zbicz
& Green 1997: 158). This rise in (potential) TBPAs has been matched by
an increased interest in the capacities of TBPAs to promote international
friendship and understanding. In Southern Africa, the notion of Peace
Parks quickly gained momentum after the improvement in the relations
between South Africa and neighbouring countries following the end of
apartheid in 1994. So far, most efforts have focused on six identified
Peace Parks in the region. The first Peace Park in Southern Africa was
the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park between South Africa and Botswana,
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established on 12 May 2000. Of the other five, the Great Limpopo Park
between South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe is the most advanced
in terms of development into a fully established and operational Peace
Park. So far, an international treaty has been signed, parts of the boundary
fence betweenMozambique and South Africa have been removed to allow
for the migration of wildlife from South Africa into Mozambique, and
active joint management of the area is being developed. The remaining
four TBPAs are in various stages of progress, as indicated in Table 1.
At the moment, these six Peace Parks can be considered as either estab-
lished TBPAs or as progressing seriously towards that status. Fifteen other
prospective Peace Parks (of which only two or three have shown signs of
progress) have been identified by the Peace Parks Foundation, a non-
governmental organisation (NGO) created with the purpose of stimulating
and facilitating the development of Peace Parks in the region. What is
remarkable about this table is that South Africa is involved in all southern
African TBPAs that we consider as progressing seriously. This is mainly
because South Africa has far more capacity in economic, organisational
and financial terms to put the idea of Peace Parks into practice than other
southern African countries. Again, as with the African Renaissance
T A B L E 1
Southern Africa’s most advanced Peace Parks
Name Countries Involved Status
1 Great Limpopo
Transfrontier Park





South Africa Officially opened
on 12.5.2000Botswana





South Africa Memorandum of Understanding
signed on 11.6.2001
Lesotho
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concept, this gives South Africa an edge in operationalising the Peace
Parks concept, which, as we shall see when we discuss the Great Limpopo
Park, can and does have major implications for the balance between
implementing partners who should in theory be equal.
In a region prone to conflict over land (Bradshaw & Ndegwa 2000),
several rationales account for the creation of Peace Parks on vast areas
of private, state and community owned land. Firstly, such Transboundary
Protected Areas initiatives are motivated by the conviction that bigger
parks will foster more effective biodiversity management, allowing for the
restoration of traditional wildlife migration routes and an ecosystem ap-
proach. Secondly, the creation of ‘superparks ’ is expected to stimulate
ecotourism. On this basis, Peace Parks have been promoted as an import-
ant means to further sustainable economic growth in Southern Africa’s
marginalised borderlands. Thirdly, by means of Community Based
Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) policies, these economic ben-
efits are explicitly promoted as benefiting local communities, thus stimu-
lating the emancipation of economically marginalised groups. Finally,
TBPAs are expected to act as vehicles for peace by enhancing regional-
isation through institutionalised cross-border cooperation and (more)
open border policies. An illustration of this is the decision of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) to promote TBPAs
as a key principle in wildlife management for its member states.11
These four rationales all hinge very closely on the dominant themes of
the African Renaissance that we have outlined above, thus providing
a logical basis for the comparisons that are often made between the
two concepts.
Beyond the popular use of the concept, the notion of Peace Parks is often
advanced by Southern African politicians as a policy concept that reflects
traditional African wildlife practices, cultural values and pre-colonial
‘border ’ customs (Asiwaju 1983; Van der Linde et al. 2001). This last point
is illustrated by the notion that TBPAs could in practice function as
‘ frontier zones ’ representing a return to pre-colonial border constructs,
whereby the precise line of the boundary is said to be relatively unimport-
ant. In African Renaissance language, Peace Parks are thus represented as
a truly African solution to African problems such as (border) conflicts and
underdevelopment. From a political public relations point of view, in order
to mobilise people, this is of course a tactical and smart move. But it is
highly questionable whether this representation has any credibility. Firstly,
TBPAs and Peace Parks originate from North America and can be
found all over the world, and as such can hardly be called truly African.
Secondly, the whole Peace Parks process in Southern Africa is largely
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driven by a very specific set of political and business elites,12 and it
is questionable whether they are best suited to represent ‘ true African’
interests.
Nevertheless, this has not stopped these actors from claiming ownership
of the Peace Parks concept, and even trying to ‘export ’ it to the rest of the
world.13 In this new malleable ‘package’ form, the potential benefits that
can be derived from Peace Parks are seemingly unending, with benefits
over a wide range of political, economic, ecological and social strata. To
quote Nelson Mandela (2001) :
I know of no political movement, no philosophy, no ideology, which does not
agree with the peace parks concept as we see it going into fruition today. It is a
concept that can be embraced by all. In a world beset by conflict and division,
peace is one of the cornerstones of the future. Peace parks are a building block in
this process, not only in our region, but potentially in the entire world.
Furthermore, Peace Parks are sold in glossy and modern media that are
easy for the popular press to pick up, by prominent people such as Nelson
Mandela, the late Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, and the influential
South African businessman and founder of the Peace Parks Foundation,
Anton Rupert.
So far, this campaign to sell the ‘Peace Parks product ’ seems to be
working. The widespread popularity of the concept of Peace Parks has
attracted a wide range of donor agencies (such as the World Bank, USAID
and the German KFW – Kredietanstallt fu¨r Wiederaufbau), NGOs and
private sector interest. Even the United States Congress recently officially
approved of the concept.14 However, reflecting Africa’s weak position in
the international system (Clapham 1996) the funding provided by Western
donors such as the World Bank and the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) has also meant that pressure was
applied for the concept of Peace Parks to be operationalised on the basis of
dominant Western economic paradigms that, like the dominant ‘globalist ’
interpretation of African Renaissance, reflect the neo-liberal outlook of the
Washington consensus. Thus, privatisation, free trade, private land own-
ership and the commercialisation of conservation have increasingly be-
come important cornerstones of Peace Parks. Moreover, as is so often the
case, the practice of Peace Parks increasingly contrasts with its rhetoric.
The next section illustrates this in more depth, through a case study of the
Great Limpopo Peace Park. With the huge expectations surrounding it,
the Great Limpopo has become a ‘make it or break it case ’ (Braack int.
2002) that will determine the success of the Peace Parks concept in prac-
tice, and hence the contribution that Peace Parks can make to an African
Renaissance.
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E M E R G I N G D I F F I C U L T I E S I N T H E G R E A T L I M P O P O
TheGreat LimpopoTransfrontier Park is a joint agreement between South
Africa,Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Its origins date back to the nineteenth
century, when a Portuguese ecologist, Gomes de Soussa, proposed that the
Limpopo area, divided byEnglish and Portuguese colonial administrations,
could be more effectively managed and conserved as one integrated eco-
system (Draper &Wels 2002). The basic idea of the present Great Limpopo
Park still relates to this old idea: a connection between the South African
Kruger Park and the Mozambican Limpopo Park, with an extension to
the Zimbabwean Gonarezhou Park by means of the Sengwe corridor.
The treaty for the 35,000 square km Great Limpopo Park was signed in
December 2002, but the first cross-border transfer of wildlife from South
Africa to Mozambique had already taken place in October 2001. The
establishment of the transboundary Park is denoted as only a step in the
process of creating the Great Limpopo Transboundary Conservation Area,
consisting of multiple land uses and, with a staggering 100,000 square
kilometres, envisaged to become the biggest TBPA in the world. This
makes for great eco-tourism appeal and subsequent expectations for social
benefits arriving from more open boundaries for many ‘transnational
communities ’ in the area. The cooperation between South Africa,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo is often heralded as
an important step towards regional integration and is often presented as
the flagship of an African Renaissance. For example, Valli Moosa (2001),
South Africa’s Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, calls
the Great Limpopo a ‘demonstrable manifestation of the African
Renaissance’. And this has been put even more strongly by South African
President Thabo Mbeki (2002) : ‘This Transfrontier Park says that each
passing day transforms the dream of an African Renaissance into reality. ’
In reality, however, more and more difficulties are emerging around the
project. The next section critically assesses the contribution that the Great
Limpopo has so far made in furthering the objectives of the African
Renaissance. For purposes of clarity and comparison, we will assess the
role of the Great Limpopo for each of the identified main cornerstones
of the African Renaissance: (1) regional cooperation; (2) emancipation; (3)
revaluation of African cultures ; (4) sustainable economic development;
and (5) democratisation.
Regional cooperation
The Great Limpopo represents a form of regional cooperation par
excellence, and as such could fulfil an important role as instigator
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of an African Renaissance. But adherence to the envisaged, and
from the African Renaissance viewpoint crucial, principles of solidarity
and equity between the partner states has proved problematic. This
is reflected in struggles over the sharing of benefits between
South Africa and neighbouring countries and over land harmonisation
policies.
The sharing of the Great Limpopo’s expected ecotourism benefits on
the basis of equity has proved difficult to realise (Braack int. 2003). While
Mozambique and Zimbabwe initially envisaged that the total income of
park fees would be shared by all three countries, South Africa, whose
Kruger Park is by far the most profitable of the areas involved, insisted
that each country would be entitled to keep its own revenues. The issue
was eventually resolved in favour of the South African viewpoint (Fakir
2003). Even though this particular dispute has ended, such conflicts linger
on in institutional memories, and influence the further course of the pro-
cess. For example, months-long delays on the Mozambican side in signing
the Treaty of the Great Limpopo, exploding the initial time schedule, were
in large measure caused by Mozambican anger over South African
‘dominance’ in the Great Limpopo (DEAT int. 2002).
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, moreover, fear that South Africa will
benefit disproportionately from the Great Limpopo, because its domi-
nation of the region’s tourist industry could result in much of the income
generated by ecotourism on their territories flowing back to South
Africa.15 This risk is especially apparent if the Great Limpopo park really
develops into a full-scale transboundary conservation area, allowing
South Africa to offer a more diversified tourism package featuring
not only parks, but also Mozambique’s beaches. South Africa in contrast
argues that its Kruger Park, which already attracts over a million tourists
a year, will function as ‘an ideal springboard for increasing tourism
throughout the rest of the TFCA’ (GLTP n.d.). However, with the
commercial sale of tenders in the Great Limpopo regulated through free
competition, the chances are high that the majority of these will end up
in the hands of South African ‘big business ’, including those in areas
now serviced by Zimbabwean or Mozambican businesses (Fakir 2003:
20; Munthali & Soto 2001 : 24–5). Perceptions in Mozambique and
Zimbabwe that South Africa will benefit the most from the creation of the
Great Limpopo, even at the expense of its partners, have been further
reinforced by South Africa’s construction of a new airport near
Nelspruit.16 This diminishes the chances for Maputo international airport
to become the main entry gate for tourism to the Great Limpopo
(Ramutsindela 2004).
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The harmonisation of land use in the Great Limpopo is another issue
creating significant tensions. The South African Kruger Park observes
a preservationist management regime, allowing no-one to hunt in the
park or to reside there (other than park staff). Mozambique’s Limpopo
Park, on the contrary, is home to an estimated 15,000 people, mostly
former refugees of the Mozambican civil war (Koch int. 2001). In ad-
dition, the northern part of Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou Park has been
‘ invaded’ by local communities (Nielsen & Chikoko 2002), in spite of
earlier pledges of Zimbabwean President Mugabe in presidential meet-
ings on the Great Limpopo that the Gonarezhou Park would not be
affected by his radical land redistribution programme (DEAT int. 2003).17
Endowing each country with the right to administer its own area (Treaty
2002: 8), the international treaty on the Great Limpopo suggests that
the linkage of the three respective conservation areas into the Great
Limpopo will not produce power struggles. However, due to the increased
ecological and economic interdependency that TBPAs generate, Peace
Parks increase the chances that countries will try to influence the ad-
ministration of land in a neighbouring country to avoid having to change
their own.
Up to now, land harmonisation in the Great Limpopo has particularly
been an issue between South Africa and Mozambique.18 An example of
this is the creation of wildlife corridors between South Africa’s Kruger
Park and Mozambique’s Limpopo Park. With the South African Kruger
Park suffering from elephant overpopulation, these wildlife corridors aid
South African wildlife management by relocating ‘excess elephants ’.19
However, South Africa fears that the communities staying in the
Mozambican part of the Great Limpopo may poach the Kruger elephants
for their ivory (Peddle et al. 2003). To avoid this, the South African
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEAT) and the Peace Parks
Foundation now seek ‘ to see communities relocated to areas outside it ’
(Munthali & Soto 2001: 13; see also University of the Witwatersrand 2002).
Mozambique’s proclamation of the conservation oriented Limpopo
National Park, replacing the Coutada 16 hunting area that allowed sus-
tainable use of natural resources and the presence of human settlements,
can partially be interpreted as Mozambique giving in to South African
pressure. South Africa has requested Mozambique to fence off its
Limpopo Park for similar purposes and this stance tends to be supported
by one of the most important foreign donors to the Great Limpopo, the
German KfW (Grossman int. 2003). These developments have raised
concerns in Mozambique that participation in the Great Limpopo could
lead to loss of sovereignty (Van Amerom 2002).
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Emancipation
With many poor and disadvantaged groups located in and around the
Great Limpopo, the Park offers ample opportunities to further the
emancipation objective of the African Renaissance. Governments and
other actors realise this and in many official documents, local communities
are indeed represented as the main beneficiaries of the Great Limpopo
(see RSA DEAT 2004).
Despite these intentions, it has so far proved difficult to translate the
creation of the Great Limpopo into improved livelihood prospects for
local communities. Promises of a better economic life have so far not
been fulfilled and perhaps seem further away than ever. There are several
reasons for this. First, the donor funding for the Great Limpopo has thus
far predominantly been directed towards wildlife management, especially
to elephant relocations (Collins int. 2002). Second, predictions of a massive
increase in tourism to the Great Limpopo are proving to have been
premature and exaggerated (Katerere et al. 2001: 19–20; Schoon 2004: 19).
Even when the Transfrontier Park is fully operational, the generation
of jobs and income through increased ecotourism to the park is likely to
remain highly limited or non-existent for local communities. It has never
been explicitly stated precisely how much communities can expect, and
therefore they can make few formal demands. Third, it is important to
note that the number of local people surrounding the Great Limpopo is
relatively high. The area bordering the south and west of the Kruger Park
alone hosts 6 million people, forcing the added advantages to be divided
among so many people that the increased benefits per person may well
be negligible. Lastly, business considerations and social welfare are
not necessarily complementary. Recent developments in the Kruger Park
illustrate this point ; 660 Kruger Park employees were retrenched in 2001
as part of privatisation strategies (Wildnet Africa 2001). The majority of
them were unskilled workers from neighbouring communities (Themba
int. 2001).
The creation of the Great Limpopo may even become disadvantageous
to the livelihoods of communities, especially those living within it. As
indicated above, communities that do not hold formal land rights are
threatened with a loss of their land. Commercial interests in the exploi-
tation of yet ‘undeveloped’ park areas may accelerate the erosion of
community land rights. This is reflected in competing claims on land
bordering the Shinguedzi River in the Mozambican part of the Great
Limpopo. Most community settlements in the Limpopo Park are in this
area, with the river making for relatively fertile land and good herding
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opportunities. However, it is precisely these areas that are also the most
attractive ones for the development of tourism lodges, because of beautiful
scenery and a relatively high occurrence of wildlife along the river. Not
surprisingly, private investors are now starting to claim these areas
(Theron int. 2002).
Reaffirmation of African cultures
The creation of the Great Limpopo could make an important contribution
to the revival of traditional African cultural values and has been presented
as such. Because it would allegedly ‘bring down the fences ’, the Great
Limpopo could enhance cultural and social exchange between transna-
tional ethnic groups like the Shangaan, and thus stimulate a cultural re-
naissance in the area. Indeed, the ‘resumption – or at least legalisation –
of cross border movement of tribal groups divided by international
boundaries ’ to ‘ integrate scientific understanding and indigenous knowledge ’
initially constituted an important planning objective of the tri-national
park (Anon: 5, our italics).
However, the formation of the Great Limpopo has not improved cross-
border access for local communities. The envisaged removal of boundary
fences has done little for local people, as they are still not allowed to cross
the international boundaries within the Great Limpopo Park. Improved
cross-border access for people at the moment mainly focuses on the needs
of international tourists, with cars, to cross the border. Linked to this, the
removal of borders is often detrimental to the geopolitical interests of one
or more of the states involved. Discussions over changes in border policies
have so far particularly focused on the complexities in the Mozambican–
South African borderland. A removal of boundary fences might increase
illegal migration from Mozambique, which is considered undesirable by
South Africa (Koetzer int. 2001). Even more importantly, illegal car traf-
ficking is prominent in the borderlands between South Africa and
Mozambique. A removal of boundaries coupled with the creation of a
cross-border road network connecting the various parts of the Great
Limpopo carries the risk that, once established, the Great Limpopo could
become a gateway for this illegal activity (Peddle et al. 2003). As a result,
the South African police and other security agencies successfully cam-
paigned for the maintenance of the border fence between the Kruger Park
and the Mozambican Limpopo Park, coupled with an increase of internal
border posts in the Great Limpopo. At the same time, the fence has been
cut in some places to allow for the migration of wildlife. These passages
are, however, not to be used by the local population. Nor, lastly, are the
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opportunities that exist to foster cultural exchange between South African
and Mozambican local communities through the Great Limpopo stimu-
lated by plans to relocate the communities out of the Limpopo Park.
Considering border access between communities in Zimbabwe and
their counterparts in Mozambique and South Africa, we must conclude
that there has not been much improvement there either. Although the
Sengwe community, which owns the land in the Sengwe corridor between
the Kruger National Park and the Zimbabwean Gonarezhou Park, in-
tends to join the Great Limpopo, the Zimbabwean government has still
not formally consulted this community to enable its involvement in ac-
cordance with Zimbabwean law. Removal of the boundary fence between
South Africa and Zimbabwe is also hampered by the fact that it acts as an
important barrier to the spread of veterinary diseases, such as bovine tu-
berculosis in buffalo (Ramutsindela 2004: 69) and foot and mouth disease.
Finally, out of fear of spill-over effects from the political violence in
Zimbabwe, such as increasing flows of refugees and arms, South Africa
and Mozambique are currently pursuing policies that make it increasingly
difficult for Zimbabwean citizens to cross the border into these countries.
Both countries are therefore unlikely to accede in the short term to open
border policies with Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo.
Democratisation
All the participating governments subscribe to democratisation and de-
centralisation of power and decision-making to the community level
within the implementation process of the Great Limpopo (Anon. 2000). In
practice, however, national governments have been reluctant to decen-
tralise power to the local level and community participation in TBPAs has
remained mere ‘window-dressing’ (Mayoral-Philips 2002). This is in part
because governments see themselves as the only actors with a negotiating
mandate where transnational issues are concerned (Bu¨scher & Dietz
forthcoming 2005). Communities were therefore not invited to take part in
official negotiations or have a seat in the International Technical
Committee (ITC), which drafted the conceptual plan, the action plan and
the trilateral agreement for the Great Limpopo. The ITC did try several
times to raise community interests and promote participation, but this was
always either insufficient or refused (Braack int. 2003; Grossman int.
2003).
One means of promoting democratisation in the Great Limpopo pro-
cess has been through the establishment of community forums. However,
the respective governments are not formally obliged to consult these
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before undertaking action. This means that in practice communities are
often only informed of the plans of their governments after these have
already become official policy (Nkatini int. 2001). A striking example
concerns the communities in the Mozambican Limpopo Park, most of
which were kept uninformed of the translocation of 25 Kruger elephants
into their territory (University of the Witswatersrand 2002). Nor, of course,
do plans for communities to be resettled out of the Mozambican part of
the Great Limpopo constitute democratic practice.
Even where local communities have relatively strong rights to land and
representation, the exercise of their rights in the Great Limpopo tends to
remain highly limited. The position of the South African Makuleke aptly
illustrates this point. Although the recognised owners of part of the land to
be included in the TBPA, they are not treated as equal partners in the
Great Limpopo (Steenkamp & Urh 2000). They have no direct represen-
tation in the Technical Committee. Nor are they allowed their own
community forum group, which means that their rights are represented by
the general community forum, alongside communities that do not own
land in Kruger and as such have different priorities and rights. South
African Minister Valli Moosa’s refusal to allow community representatives
access to a top meeting of the three ministers for environmental affairs on
the Great Limpopo in July 2000 is another indication of the low position
that local communities occupy within the Great Limpopo’s organisational
and institutional framework (Braack int. 2003). Altogether, this evidence
supports the conclusion, also drawn by Dzingirai (2004), that, rather
than democratisation and decentralisation, Peace Parks seem to promote
greater inequality between governments and communities or a ‘disen-
franchisement at large’.
Sustainable economic development
As most Peace Parks have conservation as their dominant objective, the
sustainable part in sustainable economic development is usually empha-
sised strongly (Rozemeijer int. 2003). In the Great Limpopo, biodiversity
goals are generally being achieved. Biodiversity and wildlife are already
quite well conserved in South Africa’s Kruger Park, and the Limpopo
Park in Mozambique is now slowly being restocked through elephant and
other wildlife transfers from the Kruger National Park. Not all is positive
though. The recent unrest in Zimbabwe has resulted in decreasing levels
of biodiversity in its Gonarezhou Park. Combined with the past influx of
people into Gonarezhou, this could negatively affect biodiversity levels
throughout the Great Limpopo.
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What then about the ‘economic’ in sustainable economic develop-
ment? The generation of economic development appears less straightfor-
ward than originally presented. We identify five reasons. Firstly, although
the Great Limpopo has attracted millions in funding,20 little of this appears
sustainable, involving one-off grants and donations from international
donors. Private sector investment has, contrary to what was hoped, re-
mained low in the Great Limpopo. Secondly, as noted before, estimates
that the Great Limpopo would raise millions of US dollars in tourism
income turned out to be overly optimistic. Thirdly, it is important to note
that the tourism industry is highly sensitive to political unrest (Duffy 2002).
The political crisis in Zimbabwe has led to a dramatic decline in tourism
to that country. When it became clear that Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou Park
would join the Mozambican and South African parts of the Great
Limpopo, it was feared that tourists might also avoid these areas out of fear
of spill-over effects from the violence in Zimbabwe. Fourthly, as has been
highlighted above, the regional distribution of economic benefits is far
from equal, with South Africa enjoying the great majority. Finally and
most importantly, what about the immense pressure on the park created
by the millions of people living on the borders of the Great Limpopo?
If this pressure does not somehow decrease, opportunities to sustain sus-
tainable economic development will be very limited.
C O N C L U S I O N : P E A C E P A R K S A S B R I N G E R S
O F A N A F R I C A N R E N A I S S A N C E?
This article has scrutinised the assumption that Peace Parks constitute a
key instrument in promoting the realisation of the African Renaissance.
Looking at the current situation in the Great Limpopo, the flagship of
TBPAs in Southern Africa and an alleged main driver of the African
Renaissance, we must conclude that Peace Parks so far contribute little to
the goals of an African Renaissance.
As we have discussed, an African Renaissance wishes to accomplish: (1)
emancipation of suppressed or disadvantaged groups in society ; (2) a re-
affirmation of and stronger ties between African cultures ; (3) sustainable
economic development; (4) broadening, deepening and sustenance of
democracy; and (5) regional cooperation. Although Peace Parks have the
potential to further these objectives, the social, infrastructural, ecological,
economic and institutional changes introduced by Peace Parks have as yet
done little to this end. As a case study of the Great Limpopo has shown,
Peace Parks can and often do exacerbate inequalities both between states
and between local communities and national governments. Community
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participation has often been mere ‘window-dressing’, and the notion that
Peace Parks promote and facilitate cross-border access for borderland
communities has increasingly been replaced by ‘higher political priorities ’
like the security interests of states. Furthermore, there is even concern
about the outright undermining of land rights of local communities in the
process. This leads us to the conclusion that the emancipation, cultural
reaffirmation and democracy objectives of the African Renaissance are as
yet not furthered by Peace Parks.
The contribution that Peace Parks have made to regionalisation has
also been limited. Attempts at harmonisation of laws and land use across
boundaries have proved difficult at best, and Peace Parks have not yet
achieved a different border arrangement. Even worse: on the ground
there has hardly been any implication for borders, other than the release
of elephants and other wildlife. There is thus little sign of regionalisation
through Peace Parks, certainly not to the level of realising part of an
African Renaissance.
The case study of the Great Limpopo even suggests that Peace Parks
could eventually undermine the ideals of the African Renaissance. Three
main reasons can be put forward. Firstly, South Africa’s dominance of the
Peace Parks process has led to perceptions in neighbouring countries that
it is trying to play ‘Big Brother ’. This confirms viewpoints in neighbouring
countries that the African Renaissance is really a cloak for South African
political and economic ‘ imperialism’, rather than a means to promote
pan-African regional cooperation on an egalitarian basis. It also makes
cooperation in the region more difficult and could fuel conflict. Secondly,
as a result of the lack of community participation in and limited economic
benefits from Peace Parks, community commitment to ‘ sustainable de-
velopment ’ and transboundary cooperation as a whole is likely to decrease.
As a result, indispensable grassroots support for the African Renaissance
may be dwindling. Finally, the dominance of political and business elites
and the donor-driven nature of Peace Parks undermine the notion of
‘African solutions for African problems’, and hence the ideals of African
self-determination and self-sufficiency. A ‘globalist ’ embedding of Peace
Parks will definitely not lead to an enhanced ‘Africanist ’ African
Renaissance.
Not all is negative, though. It must be recognised that Peace Parks have
laid some important foundations for an African Renaissance. More cross-
border cooperation has certainly been achieved, and this could prove to
be very valuable in the long term. Despite attracting less ecotourism than
expected, the income and jobs generated by Peace Parks may still make an
important contribution to arid and marginalised border regions. These
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potential contributions should be emphasised, so that they can be further
developed. Cooperation in Peace Parks, like any large-scale development
process, has its learning curves. Several policy instruments, such as those
for conflict mediation, could be developed to facilitate cooperation in
Peace Parks.
To ensure that Peace Parks and the African Renaissance can grow
more ‘towards each other ’, substantial institutional changes would be re-
quired in Southern Africa, not least in the sphere of regional cooperation.
As fundamental power imbalances in the region inhibit Peace Parks’
potential to contribute to the African Renaissance, an overarching re-
gional entity could take the lead in areas that are politically sensitive. It
must, however, be given the power and authority to do that. Even though
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is unofficially
very much involved and is trying to outline a macro-framework in which
Peace Parks can develop, more formal arrangements are needed to ensure
that SADC can mediate in conflicts and facilitate co-ordination in the
SADC region. The prominent place of Peace Parks in the NEPAD in-
itiative could also be used. It would be advisable to have more reflective
monitoring and evaluation guidelines and procedures in place to try and
ensure a more democratic decisionmaking process and efficient usage of
resources in Peace Parks. By making Peace Parks one of the areas within
NEPAD that are open to external evaluations, connecting Peace Parks
to NEPAD could ensure adherence to the agreed procedures.
N O T E S
1. This relates to the bioregionalism debate. See Fall 2003 for an overview of that debate in relation
to transboundary protected areas.
2. For example, the GEF donated US$15.24 million through the World Bank to the development of
the Maloti-Drakensberg TBPA (see World Bank web site).
3. Zimbabwe has of course become the notable exception in this respect.
4. This is especially how South African president Thabo Mbeki (1999) likes to portray the AR
historically.
5. Compare Dunton (2003), who attributes the first use of the term African Renaissance to Nelson
Mandela, at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in 1994.
6. We found most of the literature or information on the African Renaissance to be very normative.
Because of its ‘broadness’, the AR concept is often moulded to fit the author’s personal or professional
interests.
7. Several studies indicate that the ANC, despite its revolutionary origin and popular character, has
a ‘globalist outlook’ on many issues. See for example Tsheola 2002.
8. For a critical overview of the history of conservation and development in Africa, see Adams &
Hulme 2001.
9. Some authors even argue that the conservation development discourse is making a U-turn to
colonial fortress conservation policies. See Wilshusen et al. 2002, Bu¨scher & Dietz forthcoming 2005.
10. In addition to ecological considerations, the park was created as an enduring monument ‘ to the
long-existing relationship of peace and goodwill between the people of and Governments of Canada
and the United States ’ (Shine 1997: 37).
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11. See SADC Protocol onWildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement in Southern Africa and the
Protocol on Shared Watercourses (available from: http://www.sadc.int/index.php).
12. These political and business elites include all heads of state of Southern Africa and leaders of
industry. The latter are predominantly from the extraction of natural resources (De Beers, Remgro,
Kumba, Total), luxury goods and infrastructure (Venfin, Vodafone Group, Daimler Chrysler,
Cartier), and ecotourism industries. See the Peace Parks Foundation web site.
13. See for instance the Peace Parks Foundation web site, which relates the story of NelsonMandela
going to North and South Korea to promote setting up a Peace Park there in order to promote peace
and better international cooperation. Also, Dr. Anton Rupert, chairman and founder of the Peace
Parks Foundation, in his ‘chairman’s message’ states that ‘ the idea has been enthusiastically supported
on most continents, lately especially in the United States, South America and Europe’.
14. On 16.7.2003 the US Congress adopted a special resolution ‘supporting the efforts of the Peace
Parks Foundation to facilitate the development of Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern
Africa’ (Afrikom 2003), ‘US Congress support for Peace Parks’ (Press release for the Peace Parks
Foundation, available from: www.cpnp.co.za/newsforum/17072003.htm).
15. See note 13. In addition, GLTP n.d. stipulates that ‘From a tourism perspective, the key com-
ponents in the GLTP are Kruger National Park and the Makuleke region in South Africa, which have
more than 100 years of tourism development and currently host more than one million visitors a year. ’
With a comparative advantage of this kind, as opposed to little (Zimbabwe) and almost no tourism
infrastructure (Mozambique), there are solid grounds for Zimbabwe’s and Mozambique’s stated fear.
16. Personal observation during the first author’s attendance at two policy workshops aimed at
developing a management plan for the Great Limpopo (then still called the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou
Park), held in Skukuza, 24–27.7.2001 and Johannesburg, 14.8.2001.
17. Recent news, however, indicates that the settlements in the Zimbabwean Gonarezhou Park are
now slowly being dismantled (Financial Gazette 22.1.2004).
18. In spite of earlier arrangements with Mozambique and South Africa, the Zimbabwean
government has not yet formally consulted the Sengwe community on their preferences regarding the
Great Limpopo. This in turn has prevented the planned linkage of Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou Park to
the Great Limpopo Park by means of the Sengwe Corridor, to the dismay of tourism authorities in
Mozambique and South Africa (Chikanga 2004).
19. Interestingly, the opportunity offered by the Great Limpopo for relocating excess elephants
from Kruger Park is officially only stated once, in DEAT 2002: 16: ‘This park [the Great Limpopo] is
particularly exciting because it will re-establish to some extent, ancient migratory routes for various
animals, and relieve wildlife population pressure, notably for elephants’. Since then, as far as we know,
it has never been stated as an official aim of the Great Limpopo.
20. Including for example a donation of SAR 42 million (approximately E5.4 million) from the
German KfW Development Bank. Other major sponsors include the IUCN, the World Bank and the
Dutch World-wide Fund for Nature (WWF). Each of these provided over SAR 100.000 in sponsorship
for the translocation of Kruger elephants in the Mozambican part of the Great Limpopo in 2001 for
example. See PPF website and ‘They made it possible ’, acknowledgement of sponsors of the translo-
cation of elephants to Mozambique, 4.19.2001, on DEAT website.
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